HAWKERS AND WARTIME
An interview in 1938 with the Chief Designer of Hawkers, Sidney Camm, went well, although an excellent academic record barely improved the offered salary. Freddie Page became increasingly asked to help sort out difficult problems, of which the new Typhoon fighter provided serious examples. Its 2000-horsepower Sabre engine was complex and initially dangerously unreliable but gave level speeds of over 400 miles per hour (m.p.h.) and up to 500 m.p.h. in a dive. Propeller-induced vibration was eased under his guidance with anti-vibration mountings for the engine and a spring seat for the pilot. Tail units breaking off in flight were even more serious and were eventually cured by a series of modifications.
Two later tasks provided major innovations. The shape of the wing section of the new Tempest fighter was critical in minimizing the effect of air compressibility at 500 m.p.h. On his own initiative he developed a method using mathematical formulae to describe the shape of the wing section and combined this with a complex solution of air compressibility equations to calculate the pressure distribution. The predictions compared well with results from a very small (4 inches cross-section) wind tunnel in the USA, and it was concluded that the maximum thickness should be moved back to 40% of the chord, a development later validated by data available after the collapse of Germany in 1945. This was a remarkable prediction for 65 years ago, using only an eight-digit mechanical desk calculator and a very large slide rule. The other task was the design of a spring-tab system for the Tempest ailerons to improve the rate of roll in combat. It worked perfectly and with the new wing the Tempest was probably the best Allied fighter at 500 m.p.h. Patented, the spring tabs later formed an important element of the Canberra.
On 6 July 1940 he married Kathleen de Courcy, with the weekend off for their two-day honeymoon, followed by a loving and mutually supportive relationship until her death in 1993. Their eldest son, Gordon, was born in November 1943. In what he described as the most important decision in his career as an aeronautical engineer, he joined W. E. W. Petter as Chief Stressman in a new aircraft design office at English Electric in Preston. While living in Lancashire their second and third sons, Stephen and Alan, and their daughter, Jennifer, were born.
WARTON AND CANBERRA
The aim of the new English Electric team was a jet bomber to replace the Mosquito. Initially the design had a single centrifugal compressor engine in the fuselage. A proposed axial-flow compressor engine from Rolls Royce permitted Freddie Page to prepare a new design with two wing-mounted engines, radar bombsight in the nose, and fuel and bombs in the centre fuselage. A contract was awarded on 13 June 1945 for a study, with a further contract in January 1946 to design and build four E3/45 prototypes. Previous experience was augmented by the vast amount of world-leading captured German data, supported by subsonic and transonic wind tunnels designed and built by the company. He guided the structural design so successfully that by the first flight of the Mark I the weight was actually 0.5% less than the original estimate. The specification was modified in 1947 to B5/47 with the seriously delayed radar system in the nose being replaced by a visual bombsight and a third crew member being added. The result was the outstandingly successful three-seater Canberra Mark 2.
The first prototype was assembled at Warton and flew for the first time on Friday, 13 May 1949, followed by one of the most successful flight test programmes in postwar history. More types were used for a greater variety of purposes than any other postwar aeroplane. The first delivery to an operational Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron was in May 1951; eventually 782 were delivered to the RAF. In addition, 403 were built in the USA and 48 in Australia. In all, 1376 were produced in 21 different versions, and 15 countries adopted the aircraft. Exports included 143 new built and 115 modified and refurbished ex-RAF aircraft. Some are still in service, 60 years after conception.
New records were being set. In February 1951 the first jet aircraft flew the Atlantic nonstop without in-flight refuelling, from Aldergrove to Gander in 4 hours 37 minutes. In August 1952 the double crossing was achieved in 10 hours 3 minutes, including turnround. In August 1955 the record of 14 hours 22 minutes, including refuelling, for the round trip from London to New York to London, stood for 14 years. World altitude records were set: an Olympusengined version in May 1953 at 63 668 feet, in August 1955 it reached 65 889 feet. In August 1957 a Mark 7 fitted with a rocket motor pack reached 72 310 feet.
However, the steadily increasing workload exacerbated the conflict that had developed between the new design organization under Teddy Petter and the prewar-minded English Electric management. At the end of 1949 Petter retired and Freddie Page was appointed Chief Engineer of the newly formed aircraft division in February 1950. At just under 33 years old he had achieved his boyhood ambition with two years to spare and was responsible for the most successful of UK programmes.
P1-A, P1-B LIGHTNING, AND MULTI-PROJECT MANAGEMENT
In 1948 Freddie Page led studies on a supersonic airframe with a highly swept (60°) wing, unswept ailerons and two Sapphire engines staggered one above the other in the fuselage to reduce wave drag. A study contract in August 1948 led to the choice of fully powered controls and, as a result of wind tunnel tests, an all-moving tailplane set unconventionally below the wing. The contract for two prototype P1-As was placed in April 1950. The first flew in August 1954, seven days later becoming the first British aircraft to go supersonic, to Mǃ1.02 ('Mach 1.02') without reheat. Eventually the aircraft reached Mǃ1.53 and the two prototypes totalled over 500 flights.
By mid-1952 some major changes were required to produce an effective supersonic fighter for the RAF. These involved an intake with a central cone acting both as a radome and a shock system, a modified cockpit and fuselage-mounted missiles. A contract for three prototypes was placed in August 1953. Fortunately this was presented as an evolution, designated P1-B, not a new aircraft, thanks to Freddie Page's grasp of the workings of the official mind. This avoided the fate of several other supersonic projects that were cancelled when the cost of possible new aircraft plus missiles and the hydrogen bomb programme was growing steadily. Unfortunately the Duncan Sandys White Paper in 1957 overreacted, reducing the P1-B force to a short-range 'deterrent defender', seriously curtailing and delaying future developments.
The first prototype flew on 4 April 1957, supersonic on its first flight. In July 1957 it reached Mǃ1.7, by October 1958 it had exceeded Mǃ2, also exceeding the then world speed record without difficulty.
No other design and development team in the world made in one jump the transition from subsonic to Mǃ2 with a complex weapon system in service. Soon after entering service in June 1961 as the Lightning it was deployed to Singapore. It also became clear that the UK defence role required more fuel. In the end a belly tank was introduced, finally in-flight refuelling and over-wing tanks were also fitted. In addition to the two P1A and three P1B prototypes, there were 20 pre-production and 315 production aircraft for the RAF, as well as 56 for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
A growing management crisis
One of the side effects of the increase in the doubling of speed to Mǃ2 was a trebling of related development work and costs, as the aircraft had to be proven for subsonic, transonic and supersonic flight regimes. Additional expense came from the Ministry's insistence on using the 'development batch' approach, a concept imported from the USA without thinking things through properly in the UK context. It was abandoned in the USA after it had been adopted in the UK for the Lightning and TSR-2 projects. As a result, at one time 23 of development Lightnings were all under some form of modification or flight testing. In addition, many of these aircraft had to be to substantially the same standard as the systems needed to interact between components to give full capability to the pilot-airframe combination. All this work had to take place simultaneously with the continuing Canberra developments; a major management crisis was emerging. Under Freddie Page's leadership an intensive senior management effort was devoted to its resolution, concluding with the development and adoption of a then revolutionary 'matrix' management structure-functional grouping one way and project alignment the other-both reporting to the local company Board. It worked very well, was robust and was later widely adopted.
TSR-2, MERGERS AND AFTERMATH
The Warton design team had studied various Canberra replacements since 1953, and by 1958 their P17A was favourite to meet the supersonic tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft defined by GOR (General Operational Requirement) 339 issued in 1957. The government used this requirement as a welding flux to concentrate more than 20 aircraft companies and six engine companies into larger units. This unleashed a welter of intrigue and opportunism from mid-1958 to mid-1960; proper management control of the emerging TSR-2 programme was submerged, but the decisions then taken decided its ultimate fate. The English Electric arguments for a simpler and cheaper P17A solution gradually came to be seen by officials as a lack of response, thwarting ambitions to introduce as much new development as possible into the one programme. The requirement was redrafted as more demanding four times before the end of 1958, finally reissued and again more costly as OR343 in March 1959. Eventually the contract was awarded to Vickers, headed by Sir George Edwards, a most accomplished Whitehall lobbyist. English Electric were given a 50% share of the work under subcontract but as a junior partner. Freddie Page, by then Director and Chief Executive of the Aircraft Division of English Electric Aviation, was never as good at the semi-political lobbying; another factor was that English Electric was in the most difficult pre-delivery stage of the Lightning contracts. The Warton target had been never to exceed 75000 lb, but the penalties from the Vickersled management agreement to loading so much new development onto the programme came home to roost in steadily pushing up the weight to more than 115 000 lb, coupled with little concern about increasing cost until very late in the programme. On the positive side, the allnew equipment of the integrated weapons system had at least been well put together and the third prototype was close to flying with the fully working system when eventually the programme was cancelled.
A further cause of delay and increased costs, in spite of Freddie Page's protests, was the location of the final assembly. Having the first two aircraft flown from the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down, with the other seven development batch aircraft being assembled at Weybridge and flown from Wisley, made it probably the most expensive, time-wasting and inefficient compromise possible.
A further TSR-2 problem was with the engine. Both companies preferred the Rolls Royce RB142 but, when cancelled, the Bristol Olympus was the only alternative. To save time and money English Electric had strongly favoured the existing Olympus 14R variant with later uprating. However, the steady increases in performance demanded by the operational requirements and accepted by Vickers led to a reliance on the stretched Olympus 22R, in the final event an almost completely new engine with inevitably serious major development problems.
During the latter part of 1964 the Mountbatten and Zuckerman opposition to TSR-2 was gaining ground; there was also the ominous advent of a Labour Government. In October, Freddie Page was belatedly given overall responsibility for the programme, when it was already too late to make much difference. Solutions to the engine problems in particular had delayed first flight until Sunday 27 September 1964, but problems with the Vickers-designed main undercarriage prevented full retraction until the tenth flight in February 1965. The aircraft was flown to Warton at the end of February for further flying, landings being made on a foam carpet to reduce the reaction at touchdown; the second aircraft was about to make its first flight when the whole programme was cancelled on 6 April 1965.
Overall, in Freddie Page's opinion it was unlikely that cancellation saved the UK any money, but it certainly did a great deal to weaken the industry. The profitable, powerful and internationally respected organization built up at Warton, together with its great export record, was in serious jeopardy. The greatest impact was on Preston and Warton, where even in the most favourable circumstances the total employees had to decrease from 11500 to about 7500, a cut of 35%. The problems within the remainder of the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) were eased by closing the facilities at Luton, transferring the remainder of the Jet Provost programme to Preston and the BAC 111 wing box manufacture to Weybridge.
EUROPEAN COLLABORATION, JAGUAR AND TORNADO
In parallel with TSR-2, Warton had been studying a number of new projects including variable geometry, and since the mid-1950s work had been proceeding on several NATO projects in close collaboration with the French company Dassault. They were therefore well prepared when Whitehall announced that international collaboration would be the rule for any new major military aircraft programmes and that a joint programme would be agreed with the French on a variable-geometry combat aircraft along with a supersonic trainer/tactical attack aircraft programme. To Freddie Page the UK officials seemed surprisingly unprepared for dealing with a nation so generally nationalistic and rapacious as the French, going into negotiation declaring their position in advance with no fallback position. The resulting memoranda of understanding in May 1965 gave the French the lead on the trainer based on their ECAT (École de Combat et Appui Tactique) requirement, with the British to lead on the joint AngloFrench Variable-Geometry aircraft (AFVG) with Dassault as the French industrial partner. The smaller ECAT aircraft quickly materialized as the Jaguar programme. The AFVG required a series of project studies and in the end, after a number of high-level debates as to who was actually leading the programme, it was finally terminated by a peculiar turn of events. By the time the that UK was contractually committed to the Jaguar under French leadership, BAC realized that Dassault was also designing and making an entirely French prototype in secret, the Mirage 3G. This was reported to initially incredulous UK officials; the French finally admitted the situation and the AFVG programme rapidly collapsed.
Jaguar
Work on the Jaguar proceeded well, largely because both sides welcomed collaboration and generally tried to make it work on an equal partnership basis, and partly because the administration was under efficient French Government procedures, with the engines sublet to the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). Formally inaugurated in mid-1965, the two-seater trainer requirement was soon relegated by both nations to a minor role relative to the single-seat groundattack version. Later, orders were increased from 150 for each side to 200 per side. The design was frozen by November 1965, early drawings were issued early in 1966 with metal cut by the summer, and the first flight was in September 1968. Deliveries to service started in late 1972 and squadrons became operational in 1973.
For industrial management there was a joint aircraft company, Sepecat, with joint chairmanship shared by the two aircraft companies; the name 'Jaguar' was chosen because it was the same in both languages with the right aggressive connotation. Despite problems with the new engine, the timescales from initial contract to entry to service compared well with the best international achievements, including the American F16 usually held up as the classic example.
Overall the programme was very successful, giving excellent service to both home airforces, and was exported by BAC to Ecuador, Oman and India, where Sir Frederick Page was later to achieve a major triumph with full licensed production.
Tornado
With support from the MoD, work continued on a UK VG until mid-1967, when contact was made with MBB Munich, which had been working on a cancelled supersonic VSTOL aircraft with the USA. From the official side the UK, West Germany and Italy had been exploring possible collaboration with a new combat aircraft and in 1968 they were joined by Holland, Belgium and Canada. There were numerous joint meetings but by October 1968 Belgium had withdrawn, then the Canadians and in the summer of 1969 the Dutch also. By autumn 1969 Panavia Aircraft GmbH was operating in Munich, with BAC and MBB each holding 42.5% and Air Italia (FIAT) holding 15% of the shares, roughly representing the relative numbers of aircraft to be ordered, but all three countries equally represented on the industrial Panavia Board with chairmanship rotating between companies every two years. The official set-up of the NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) was the management organization NAMMO, the group of civil servants in the member countries overall responsible for the programme, and NAMMA their executive agency of officials located in Munich, close to the offices of Panavia. Although Panavia and the industrial partners were able to work quickly, the tedious manner of the NAMMO procedures and the need for the officials and Air Forces to resolve conflicting views about finance, single crew or two crew, engines and equipment standards were protracted; full development authority was not received until August 1972. The first prototype was completed, but waited several months for flight clearance of the new engines, and first flew in August 1974 with a BAC test pilot in charge and an MBB second pilot.
Originally the engine was supposed to be chosen as a result of competition between Rolls Royce, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric of America, but British officials quickly made it clear that if an American engine was chosen the UK would withdraw from the programme. Hence the only serious proposal was the RB199, to be developed under the direct control of mainly British officials. Sir Frederick cited this as yet another example of protecting Rolls Royce's interests and another reason why so little effort was made to reinforce BAC's position. The RB199 used the Rolls Royce three-spool civil engine technology, but the small size of this engine made the engineering of items such as cooling of the turbine blades extremely difficult. Moreover, the control system had to manage three spools and the urgent demands of combat and reheat use. Although the engine finally operated satisfactorily there were significant cost increases and many delays to the whole programme. Unfortunately the larger and more efficient fan promised by Rolls Royce could not be produced within an acceptable timescale and cost, so the full performance of the UK fighter version, the Air Defence Variant (ADV), was never achieved.
In contrast the integrated navigation attack system was a complete success. This was primarily a Panavia management responsibility with a great deal of freedom in the choice of equipment. For instance, the key terrain-following and ground-mapping radar was chosen as a development of the Texas Instruments equipment in the F111, despite intense lobbying by other parties, and the whole system performed exceptionally well. This contrasted with the ADV radar developed by GEC Avionics under the supervision of British officials, resulting in the first production batch of AVD Tornados delivered with concrete weights in the nose instead of radars; even when eventually delivered, the radars were not very satisfactory.
Sir Frederick Page pointed out the clear moral here, that genuine prime contractorship with freedom of choice produces a much more satisfactory weapon system than intervention by officials anxious to promote and protect particular component suppliers. Nevertheless, in spite of it all the programme succeeded, with a total of 809 delivered (385 to the RAF, 325 to the German Air Force and Navy and 100 to the Italian Air Force) plus 72 for Saudi Arabia. The aircraft had an active service in war on several critical areas and the programme overall has been a great success.
BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION AND UK CIVIL AIRCRAFT PROGRAMMES
In December 1972 Freddie Page was appointed Managing Director Aircraft responsible for all the BAC aircraft business. This fulfilled a long-held wish to become involved in civil programmes, although the situation in the civil aircraft division was in fact quite serious. There was no effective project management structure, even on Concorde, which also had a long way to go to full development.
It was urgent to trim facilities and manpower to match a realistic forecast. The Concorde production programme was unrealistic at three per month: the failure of American and Russian efforts to develop supersonic airliners meant that it was going to be difficult to negotiate overflying rights; those countries not buying Concorde were likely to impose other restrictions.
Moreover, virtually all major nations insisted that any over-flying should be subsonic to avoid booms. In 1974 both governments agreed to end production after the completion of 16 aircraft. Workload problems were eased by work from the military division, and the BAC111 termination was eased by setting up a direct sale and licensed manufacturer in Romania.
Trimming of facilities included the closure of about two-thirds of the Weybridge site by area. For Concorde an authoritative management team was set up and linked to a similar organization on the French side; eventually in 1976 certification was achieved, with Freddie Page handing over the first British Airways aircraft to the then Chairman in 1976.
EXPORTING AND OVERSEAS
Interest in Saudi Arabia developed in the period 1963-64 after Freddie Page's recognition that if there were oil there could be profitable business, and that the key to success was the provision of a supersonic fighter. Fortunately the Lightning reinforced the air defences of Singapore with RAF detachments flying via Bahrain. It was arranged that one aircraft could be taken into BAC's charge, flown to Riyadh for demonstration (where the company would supply all the support) and then returned to Bahrain for the RAF. The competitor was the American Lockheed F104 associated with a United States Air Force package of missiles, training, servicing, and so on. The Lighting put on a first-class display free from all the usual air-show restrictions; it was a splendidly noisy ending with a hefty double supersonic bang, with everyone in the party clapping and cheering. The Lockheed F104 demonstration a couple of days later did not go nearly so well. The key factor in consolidating the British bid was an agreement on early delivery of a small force code named 'Magic Carpet' with pilots and some Thunderbird anti-aircraft missiles in August 1966. The full British package was the largest single export order ever won by the UK. Deliveries started in July 1968, followed by the complement of new Lightnings and Strikemasters.
In 1972 it was recognized that the Airwork consortium operating support operations was becoming unworkable and it was agreed that BAC should take over management of the British programme. It became clear to Freddie Page that the ultimate work could go well beyond the existing contracts, with great potential for the future. He made the rounds of Whitehall contacting all the relevant departments of government and briefing them fully on the potential business and what was necessary to achieve success. At the subsequent joint meeting with all the relevant ministries the three ministers agreed when asked; they had all received identical departmental briefs as a result of his Whitehall tour. This was the birth of the biggest series of export contracts ever won by the UK and supervised-as he had wished-by a British Government mission largely staffed by RAF personnel paid for by the contract and working closely with BAC.
By 1980, when he asked if there were complaints to discuss the reply came, 'there are no problems; let us talk of the future'. So discussions were started for Hawks, Tornados and new facilities, leading eventually to the first seeds being sown for what would ultimately become the vast Al Yamamah enterprise.
Interest in the Middle East and its oil-rich countries extended beyond Saudi Arabia; an early success was the sale of Lightnings to Kuwait in 1966 and the aircraft were delivered in 1968.
Oman had bought Hunters and were advised by a strong British team, which included the Commander of the Sultan's Airforce. In Oman, unlike Saudi Arabia, Airwork were doing a good job supervised by a strong RAF team, and in 1974 during negotiation Strikemasters were sold for training, Jaguars for combat and Rapiers for close air defence.
There was a prolonged campaign to sell Hawks to the Emirates and Abu Dhabi, which became something of a cause célèbre because Mrs Thatcher became involved. Surprised that Abu Dhabi was not on the shortlist of prospects she had been given-because three of the six prospects suggested by
BRITISH AEROSPACE, THE AIRCRAFT GROUP AND NEW PROGRAMMES
The Labour Party policy to nationalize the aerospace industry was formally adopted in 1974. Lord Beswick, formerly an advisor to Sir George Edwards at BAC, was a very experienced operator and aerospace enthusiast and was appointed Chairman of the Organizing Committee. In December 1976 Sir Frederick Page was finally asked to serve on the committee. Vesting day was not until 29 April 1977 as a result of Conservative delaying tactics. Freddie Page was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive of the Aircraft Group, but with a pay freeze he was once again in the position of earning less than one of his senior executives. His opinion about nationalization was simply that it was the only way of bringing about a strong and unified aerospace industry.
One first task of the new management was to design the detailed organization of the Aircraft Group. The outcome was six divisions, each being self-accounting with its own board, plus a small HQ organization providing coordination and monitoring functions between civil and military aircraft, finance, commercial, manufacturing and personnel activities. This form of organization proved effective and efficient, remaining basically the same for more than seven years. It allowed practical experience obtained to be available to the most able and, for those most suitable, was an excellent background leading to board service.
A parallel major task was to review the group projects and resources, where there were major problems. The civil aircraft programmes of BAC posed future problems but, immediately, both Scottish Aviation and the Hawker Siddeley companies were nearly out of work. On the positive side there was plenty of skilled, experienced and highly motivated personnel at all levels and several good ongoing projects, all capable of further development, such as Tornado, Jaguar, Hawk, Harrier, HS 125 and the Airbus wing boxes together with the huge prospects in Saudi Arabia.
The group soon developed long-term forecasts covering all aspects. It soon became clear that, because in the run-up to nationalization the predecessor parent companies had made virtually no investment in replacement projects, unless some urgent actions were taken the remaining civil aircraft business would decrease to zero by the early 1980s. However, all the world market forecasts showed the civil aircraft market growing and that by the year 2000 it would probably exceed the military. Some decisions were relatively easy-slowly build about 20 more HS 748s, and fit the HS 125 with one of the new quieter engines; fortunately for the Scottish division, fitting new engines to the HP Jetstream twin turboprop made it able to meet new American Civil Aviation upgraded requirements for feeder line aircraft, enabling it to reach the US market well ahead of competitors. The most difficult decision was to maintain an independent UK presence in the 100-seater regional jet market. Forecasts showed this to be large for the foreseeable future, but with several strongly entrenched competitors. Fortunately Hawker Siddeley had worked on the 136 project, a four-engined 70-80-seater jet, but had dropped it with impending nationalization. Market analysis was encouraging and, by using four of the new Avco-Lycoming AL-502 engines, the design was finalized and became known as the BAE 146. However, the financial viability of this project was very sensitive to the rate of exchange between the pound sterling and the US dollar. The final civil aircraft decision was the extent of the participation in Airbus-either electing to remain subcontractors for the wing boxes (work under some threat of being withdrawn by the French and German partners) or joining Airbus Industrie as a partner. Eventually a 20% partnership was secured with full participation rights.
Lord Beswick as Chairman strongly supported the full programme. The UK Government (Her Majesty's Government; HMG) decided to support it and make additional capital available if required, based on the worst scenario in the group's long-term forecast. In fact the total business prospered to such an extent that HMG was paid an annual dividend, the group generated their own funds for investment and up to the end of Sir Frederick's retirement in 1983-by which time the civil programme included some additional developments to the 125, 146 and the Airbus family-BAe generated all its own financial requirements and never needed these stand-by financial facilities.
An important aspect was the major difficulty in predicting future sales. Sir Frederick devised a mathematical theory to describe the total civil aircraft market, which yielded the result 'Total passenger-kilometres flown per annum is a function of gross domestic product divided by revenue per passenger-kilometre'. Plotting historical totals of passenger-kilometres flown per annum on a three-year moving average basis against the stated ratio on a log/log scale produced a remarkable correlation-almost a straight line over 25 years-with average sustainable growth rate between 5% and 6% per annum. His prediction for future years created considerable interest when he gave the Sir Henry Royce Memorial Lecture in Derby in 1982. This understanding gave the group the courage to hold the production rate down when optimistic forecasts suggested it needed to be raised, avoiding the reaction which can set in when airlines canceled their orders during periods of traffic down-turn. This policy of producing aircraft at a relatively lower rate, often associated with scaling down the optimistic salesman's estimates by as much as 50% or more, gave a more stable workforce and allowed expenditure to be held even if it meant losing a few sales occasionally. This discipline was later lost when the Aircraft Group and the Dynamics Group were broken up after Sir Frederick's retirement.
Within the Aircraft Group, the military programmes, although a mixed bag, were in considerably better shape than the civil. The European collaborative programmes run from Warton, namely Jaguar and Tornado, had both done well and there were excellent prospects for exports in Saudi Arabia. The national programmes, Harrier, Hawk and Nimrod, were run by Hawker Siddeley and showed some problems. The Harrier programme threatened to be in the doldrums because both the RAF and the US Marine Corps orders were virtually complete and there was only a slow rate of production of Sea Harriers for the Royal Navy. There were, however, export sales prospects in India and Italy; Indonesia was a possibility, and further orders did come from India and Spain.
But the big prize was an American order for the US-developed AV-8B. The UK had a requirement for an improved Harrier Mark II but for only about 60 aircraft, with the obvious danger that it would probably not survive if the UK had to bear the whole development cost. In 1980 an assessment was made of the joint programme relative to two national programmes. The joint programme won easily for both British Aerospace (BAe) and the MoD. Sir Frederick Page had a one-to-one meeting with the then Permanent Secretary at the MoD explaining the situation, and both sides decided that they would seek an arrangement for the joint programme. International agreement was achieved on favourable terms for BAe, contracts were signed in 1981 and manufacture was based on the design developed by McDonald Douglas in the USA, which used carbon fibre extensively for the structure of the new larger wing and a new front fuselage, both manufactured in the USA.
The Hawk was doing well with the RAF, but export was essential to keep the line going. Finland and then Indonesia in 1978 came forward; feeding Adour engine developments for the Jaguar into the Hawk programme improved its competitive edge, with the aircraft finally being selected for the US Navy T45A programme in 1983. Hawk was finally selected as the fast jet trainer as part of the huge Saudi Al Yamamah project in 1986, finally securing its preeminent position as the world's best light ground attack and advanced trainer aircraft.
The Nimrod ASW programme had been completed by Hawker Siddeley before BAe was formed, and it had proved very satisfactory. However, development of the Nimrod as an early warning aircraft, based on a completely new radar system to be provided by GEC having synchronized scanners in the nose and the tail, had been proposed and accepted by the MoD in preference to purchasing the proven Boeing AWACS aircraft. There was no overall prime contractor; GEC had a contract to develop the radar, directed from the MoD, while Hawker Siddeley had a separate MoD contract to supply the airframe and install the equipment. The gloomy conclusions of the Aircraft Group review were passed to the MoD but several years of procrastination followed, with protestations from GEC that all was well despite the knowledge that the trials were showing difficulties. Freddie Page found it extremely difficult to convince GEC, in particularly Lord Weinstock the Managing Director, that cancellation was likely. The radar never did operate satisfactorily and the programme was eventually cancelled in favour of the Boeing AWACS about three years after Sir Frederick retired.
The other major military objective was the launch of a new European cooperative supersonic fighter. For some years the Warton team had been preparing the basis of a possible fighter programme to follow Tornado. A range of possible options were studied, including those with supersonic and vertical take-off and landing capabilities, which concluded that the optimum was a delta wing with a 'canard' foreplane, artificially stabilized with fly-by-wire controls, and a largely carbon fibre structure. Setting out to secure the necessary technology capability, the Warton team secured MoD contracts to develop and fly a quadruplex electronically controlled Jaguar and to build a carbon fibre Jaguar wing, Sir Frederick Page having previously authorized extensive company-funded carbon fibre development programmes. This technology later allowed Warton to design the wing for the new Swedish 'Grippen' fighter. Additional company-funded programmes allowed Warton to lead teams from the key UK avionics companies to develop the basis of all-digital on-board electronics systems. The latter teams progressively evolved into a group of managing directors of these companies acting as a 'Think-tank' to guide and support the lobbying of HMG for the new project. The eventual result was the launch of the EAP (Experimental Aircraft Programme), funded equally by the MoD and BAe, with MBB and Air Italia participation, announced at the Farnborough air show in September 1982. This triggered a French reaction, announcing their own rival national programme at the Paris Air Show in June 1983. In response, the German Government issued a clear call for the UK, Germany, Italy and France to come together in a joint European programme, but understandably to avoid bias withdrew its support for MBB, leaving BAe to take on the centre fuselage work. After Sir Frederick Page had retired, three years of intense joint teamwork and tough negotiations gave birth to the Eurofighter programme, the French withdrawing in favour of a national programme after failing to win a dominant position. In the autumn of 1985 the UK, Germany, Italy and eventually Spain launched the programme with a joint memorandum of understanding.
PRIVATIZATION AND RETIREMENT
Freddie Page was knighted in 1979, the year in which a Conservative Government displaced Labour. Because of its favourable financial state, BAe was the first nationalized industry to be nominated for privatization. All the property, rights, liabilities and obligations of the previously nationalized company were vested in BAe plc on 1 January 1981. Dr Austin ('Tin') Pearce was confidentially nominated Chairman designate in December 1979. His appointment had much to do with his standing in the city, an important consideration in relation to privatization, although his knowledge of the aerospace industry itself was minimal. There followed a tedious period of discussion on appointments, salaries and pensions, and on 4 February 1981 48.43% of BAe was offered for sale, 48.40% to be retained by HMG and 3.14% offered to the employees. The flotation was a great success, and Sir Frederick remained as Chairman and Chief Executive of the Aircraft Group. The number of non-executive directors was now five instead of two, one remaining from the nationalized company.
Soon after Tin Pearce's nomination as Chairman designate in December 1979, Sir Frederick Page and George Jefferson met with him to discuss the basis on which they would work in running the company. The latter two strongly recommended that, between board meetings, the three should act as an executive group calling in any of the other directors as necessary, to deal promptly with any matters not requiring full board approval. This was agreed. It soon became apparent, however, that Tin Pearce was not going to work on the basis of the three acting as a executive group and George Jefferson quickly became disenchanted, leaving to become the first chairman of British Telecom. He was replaced by his deputy, Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo.
It was difficult to keep real work going during the run-up, and plans for any rationalization of the six-divisional group had to be delayed until after flotation was complete. However, a complete reassessment in depth of the civil aircraft programmes was started and a range of parameters were examined, including possible worst cases, and a computer study was undertaken to assess possible financial requirements. The worst case had indicated a possible maximum requirement for £100 million of additional working capital; the Offer for Sale document therefore included a reference to a loan facility set up to cover this eventuality. Up to the time of Sir Frederick's retirement, however, this facility was not needed because liquid assets always exceeded borrowings.
After his retirement, having already decided to avoid engagement in consultancy or nonexecutive directorships, Freddie Page was involved in a range of activities with the Royal Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society, the Royal Institution, Cheltenham College and also the Farnham Maltings, serving on the councils of all these institutions. He was also able to devote time in giving practical support for his wife Kathleen in her resumption of her work as a painter, the artistic career she had put on hold when they were married. The work at the Maltings provided opportunities for considerable practical work near his home, and the Royal Academy of Engineering provided the opportunity to act as chairman for a group of Fellows assisted by consultants to conduct a study for the Department of the Environment into techniques for reducing acidic emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. Shortly before retirement he accepted responsibility for the British contribution on aviation to the Fourth Convocation of Engineering Academies, Apart from getting EFA formally launched, the main tasks were to complete the rationalisation programme, to raise productivity, thus reducing costs, and to develop the Airbus programme whilst controlling the rest of the civil projects. Sales drives, technology and staff development, nurturing the very important Saudi Arabian project and careful attention to the Group finances were also built into the group management system. In all these respects, the small Group HQ team played a vital role as well as coordinating divisional activities and making best use of total resources. This well proven organisation which had coped well with the traumas of nationalisation and then privatisation, economic recession and the Falklands war as well as the previously mentioned activities, was soon to be disrupted by a series of management changes and decisions.
During 1984, the A320 and ATP were started with inadequate HMG launch aid. My policy in 1982 had been to argue for 100% launch aid for the A320 and not to launch the ATP in the belief that we could at least get the statutory maximum 50% launch aid on the A320. Settling for less than 50% plus ATP launch was an unacceptable financial burden. The BAe negotiating position was strong enough to have achieved my objective because HMG was anxious to sell the remaining 48.43% of BAe shares that it held and would not have wished to have a Public debate about withdrawal from the Airbus programme.
During 1985 those remaining HMG shares were sold and this gave the top management even greater freedom. Under the guise of 'cutting out a layer of management', standard consultant's jargon, the groups were abolished and 7 diverse divisions and 8 other executive HQ departments reported directly and independently, and 5 subsidiary companies also had to be supervised; details of all this are given in the 1985 BAe annual report. It was an impossible span of control. Thus the careful financial control and coordination of new project development, production, marketing, contracts, research, rationalisation, personnel development, etc. imposed by group HQ were replaced by divisional financial targets and meaningless jargon such as 'Your feet will be held to the fire to meet those targets.' Roasted feet are not much help in solving difficult management, commercial and highly technical problems and securing coordination across all the civil and military aircraft, weapons and electronics activities. Naturally, all these divisions fought their own corners regardless of the overall effect and, as BAe was expanded some ill judged moves were made. Also, Ivan Yates and Hugh Metcalf were given ill defined HQ jobs with little real power and both were eventually encouraged to retire early, a terrible waste of talent and experience, but it gave top management even greater freedom.
During this time also, civil and military aircraft were formally separated, something HMG departments had been pushing for for many years so as to be able to squeeze both aspects more effectively. Convenient though this was for HMG bureaucrats, it was bad financially for BAe and HMG because it did not reflect the reality of efficient design and production; a very large number of parts, whether civil or military, can be designed, made and tested by the same people and facilities. Complete separation merely encourages increased duplication, costs and staffing.
The break up of the Aircraft Group and the separation of military and civil aircraft also removed important checks and balances. Civil aircraft design and manufacture is a risky business and it is therefore necessary to subject all aspects to very critical scrutiny. Most of the Group HQ personnel owed no particular allegiance to either civil or military aircraft and, based on experience of both, could take a strictly dispassionate view of key issues. Moreover, the military people could be relied upon to view any expensive civil aircraft proposals very critically. For example, civil aircraft salesmen are notoriously optimistic, particularly about the rate of sales, and therefore, under critical Group scrutiny, civil sales forecasts were not only cut back but also the suggested rates of production were often halved. Once these checks were removed, the 146 and Jetstream production rates became too high when an (inevitable) civil aircraft recession arrived, with the necessity of a resort to leasing contracts on unfavourable terms to dispose of some of the aircraft and considerable financial liabilities accrued if the aircraft were returned and stored.
In 1987, Royal Ordnance, Steinheil Optronic, Ballast Nedam and part of Systems Designers were acquired for more than £374m; the exact amount is difficult to determine from the published accounts. Other companies such as BAe Simulation were also formed.
At the beginning of 1988 the Rover Group was acquired for more than £150m. These and other acquisitions were no doubt prompted by the view of the finance director that BAe's asset base needed to be strengthened, another of those dubious City statements that always need to be challenged. So this greatly encouraged continuation of the buying spree.
In 1988 there was yet another major management reshuffle. There was some devolution of authority with the formation of 8 separate businesses with their own boards yet devolution to 2 group boards had been condemned only 3 years earlier as inefficient! However, this still left 8 companies and 3 HQ departments reporting directly plus direct control of BAe (Space Systems) Ltd and a rag bag of 10 companies in BAe Enterprises Ltd.
The buying spree continued apace. In 1989, Arlington Securities was acquired for 278m plus expenses at a premium of 64%. The arguments for this purchase are set out in the first two sections of the chairman's letter to share-holders covering the offer documents issued on 24 July 1989. The first section makes it clear that, with the acquisition of Arlington, the BAe land and property bank would be substantially increased, not reduced as some had hoped, and the optimistic view of Arlington's 'attractive stream of profits' in the second section was certainly not borne out subsequently, especially if indebtedness is taken into account. Careful reading of the full offer document reveals that BAe was taking on £115m of debt to add to its own already alarming £885m; that information was carefully relegated to the fine print on p30. It is an interesting coincidence that the total acquisition costs and debt of Arlington approximated to the total BAe rights issue of 1991. Taking everything into account, it remains to be seen whether Arlington will have made a net contribution from time of purchase until after the year 2000. It would have been far better to have solved the surplus BAe land and facilities problem by individual disposals either by direct negotiation locally or through independent agents of whom Arlington could have been one; that would have generated much needed immediate cash resources, not absorbed them at a critical time, and is what we had done in the past.
By 1990, a whole raft of companies had been formed and acquired. The 1990 annual report and accounts has two columns of them filling a whole page including, in addition to those already mentioned, Heckler and Koch, Reflectone Inc., Spectrum Technologies Ltd., etc.
In 1977/8 and again in 1980/1 when major commitments were undertaken, they were preceded by a long term financial forecast in which risks were assessed. In 1980/1, a computer analysis took account of a wide range of economic conditions and possible technical, manufacturing and sales problems. In both cases, appropriate reserve financial facilities ware set up to cover the worst case; in 1981, this was referred to in the Offer for Sale document as £400m. Because of careful control and coordination by the two groups up to 1983,when I retired, neither facility had been required and the financial strength of BAe was such that well over £700m of purchases could subsequently be made before trouble struck. Think what progress could have been made if only half that sum had been reinvested in the basic business.
The result of these management changes and the buying spree are clearly reflected in key financial ratios such as profit after tax and exceptional items (taken as a 5 year moving average to smooth the effects of arbitrary write offs, taxation, etc.) and investments and current assets less total liabilities as a % of sales which are plotted in fig. 1 . The last ratio is not usually highlighted by the easygoing British accounting standards but it is a critical one. In most businesses, fixed assets and investments are quoted on the basis of a going concern and can easily be inflated and cannot easily be realised in a major crisis whereas current assets less total liabilities as a % of sales indicates how much cash, in relation to the scale of the business, is likely to be available to meet a crisis or whether there is a debt problem looming. The ratios show a marked deterioration from 1987 until, in 1989/90, they look very different from the pre 1985 pattern and show that the company had become much more vulnerable to the unfavourable trading conditions which developed in 1990/1.
The Chief Executive was replaced at the end of 1989 and many hard decisions had to be made. An attempt to rescue the situation by means of a rights issue in 1991 was insufficient and both the chairman and the financial director resigned. The company was kept afloat mainly by the strength of the military aircraft business and the Saudi Arabian Al Yamamah contract springing from the supply of Lightnings and other aircraft and services from 1967 onwards. An interim chairman took over in 1991 and was replaced in May 1992 and in April 1994 was in turn replaced, a sorry tale of chairmen lacking directly relevant UK experience to guide such a long term, technical and demanding business as aerospace. By 1994, several more non-core businesses had been sold and thousands of good, ordinary people lost their jobs.
As one or two more engineers and others with some experience in aerospace gain more influence, somewhat more sensible organisation structures and policies are emerging but whether it will be possible to get back to the sound basis we enjoyed when I retired is doubtful and, meanwhile, international competition has intensified.
It has always seemed odd to me that, particularly in UK, financial, commercial and business school people with little or no practical experience or training in the industry are considered to be suitable for the top boardroom posts whereas engineers have been regarded with suspicion. Perhaps it is because most city types and politicians are geared to short term thinking and buzz words but aeronautical engineers must be creative and think long term. Again I was lucky in helping to start English Electric Aviation from scratch in difficult circumstances and then being pitched into the top job at a time when the company was being transformed from a single-to a multi-project organisation. That and having to argue the case for and to organise its further growth forced me to get to grips with realistic long term financial, commercial and general business planning as well as all branches of aeronautical engineering at an early stage in my career.
CURRENT ASSETS LESS TOTAL LIABILITIES AS % OF SALES
The lesson to be learnt from the experiences of 1985-1995 is that the aerospace industry must be directed and managed by full time, well qualified and trained people experienced in aerospace with a good proportion of engineers. Snap judgements by entrepreneurial types, short term thinking and obeisance to financial buzz words are a disastrous mixture, especially when changes are not based on long term experience in the industry.
The importance of long experience and long term forward planning cannot be over emphasised. It is not difficult to improve the financial results of most businesses in the short term by prejudicing the long term situation, but, in aerospace, the time-scales and costs of major projects are so large that short term expediency spells disaster. Even opting out of a major line of business tends to be costly and the costs and timescales of attempting to get back in again are enormous. One hopes that the new top management of BAe and Whitehall understand these issues, but I wish that there were a few more battle hardened aerospace engineers in the top ranks and that some of the senior administrative civil servants had some technical training and industrial experience.
I suppose that I have been exceptionally fortunate not only at Rutlish and Cambridge but also in having a progressive career in the same industry for 45 years. However, in case it seems that I had an easy ride, let me recapitulate some of the externally imposed difficulties that had to be faced.
